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Abstract
This paper studies a new and challenging wireless surveillance problem where a legitimate monitor
attempts to eavesdrop two suspicious communication links simultaneously. To facilitate concurrent
eavesdropping, our multi-antenna legitimate monitor employs a proactive eavesdropping via jamming
approach, by selectively jamming suspicious receivers to lower the transmission rates of the target
links. In particular, we are interested in characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the
minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE) receiver case, by optimizing the legitimate monitor’s jamming
transmit covariance matrix subject to its power budget. As the monitor cannot hear more than what
suspicious links transmit, the achievable eavesdropping rate region is essentially the intersection of
the achievable rate region for the two suspicious links and that for the two eavesdropping links.
The former region can be purposely altered by the monitor’s jamming transmit covariance matrix,
whereas the latter region is fixed when the MMSE receiver is employed. Therefore, we first analytically
characterize the achievable rate region for the two suspicious links via optimizing the jamming transmit
covariance matrix and then obtain the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver
case. In addition, as the achievable rate region for suspicious links is in general non-convex, we also
propose a time-sharing based jamming strategy to enlarge this region and characterize the corresponding
achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. Furthermore, we also extend our study
to the MMSE with successive interference cancellation (MMSE-SIC) receiver case and characterize
the corresponding achievable eavesdropping rate region by jointly optimizing the time-sharing factor
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2between different decoding orders. Finally, numerical results are provided to corroborate our analysis
and examine the eavesdropping performance.
Index Terms
Wireless surveillance, suspicious communication, proactive eavesdropping, jamming, beamforming,
interference cancellation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many infrastructure-free wireless communication networks (e.g., device-to-
device (D2D) communications, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications, and mobile
ad hoc communications) have emerged as important decentralized supplements to conventional
infrastructure-based wireless networks for facilitating direct information exchange among mobile
users [2]-[3]. However, these infrastructure-free communication networks may be misused by
illegal users such as terrorists, criminals and business spies who deploy a UAV-mounted flying
site or an ad hoc link to jeopardize public safety, commit crimes, and send back confidential
information of trades. In this context, the technique of wireless surveillance was proposed, which
allows the legitimate monitor to eavesdrop the suspicious communication links or jam them to
disable their communications [4]-[5].
The existing literature on wireless surveillance can be mainly classified into two categories.
The first one is passive eavesdropping, for which the legitimate monitor silently intercepts the
signals of suspicious links. Note that this approach is efficient only when the channel condition
of the eavesdropping link is better than that of the suspicious link. However, in practice, this
condition cannot be guaranteed due to sometimes the eavesdropper has to be distant from the
suspicious transmitter to avoid getting exposed. To tackle this issue, another approach, namely,
proactive eavesdropping, was proposed in [6]-[7], where the legitimate monitor operates in a full-
duplex mode for receiving the suspicious signals and sending jamming signals concurrently. The
jamming signals can decrease the data rate of the suspicious link and thus make the eavesdropping
feasible even for the case when the eavesdropping link has a worse channel condition than the
suspicious link without jamming. In addition, [8] proposed a spoofing relay approach to enhance
the information surveillance capability. Recently, the proactive eavesdropping approach has been
investigated under various system setups, including relay systems [9]-[12], multi-antenna systems
[13]-[14], cognitive radio systems [15], UAV-enabled wireless networks [16]-[17], and parallel
3fading channels [18]. Specifically, in [9] and [10] the authors studied the wireless surveillance
of a two-hop decode-and-forward (DF) relaying communication systems. In [11], the proactive
monitoring via jamming over an amplify-and-forward (AF) relay network was investigated.
Different from [9]-[11] in which the relay helps the suspicious transmitter forward messages
to the suspicious receiver, [12] considered a proactive eavesdropping scenario with a group
of full-duplex AF relays to aid the legitimate monitor for eavesdropping. Moreover, for multi-
antenna wireless surveillance systems, efficient jamming schemes were proposed in [13] and [14]
for maximizing the eavesdropping non-outage probability and increasing the worst-case chance
of successful monitoring, respectively. In [15], the optimal jamming beamforming vector was
designed to maximize the achievable eavesdropping rate in cognitive radio networks. In [16], the
UAV-assisted wireless surveillance system was investigated, where a full-duplex monitor located
on the ground eavesdrops the ground suspicious communication while sending the collected
suspicious information to the UAV. In [17], an efficient proactive jamming scheme was proposed
to maximize the achievable eavesdropping rate in a UAV-aided suspicious communication system.
More recently, the authors in [18] studied the jamming-assisted proactive eavesdropping over
parallel independently fading channels.
It should be pointed out that all the above mentioned works consider only the case of a
single suspicious communication link. However, in practice, it is likely to have more than one
suspicious communication links in the same district to monitor. Thus, we are motivated to
study a new wireless surveillance scenario where a legitimate monitor eavesdrops two suspicious
communication links at the same time. Our legitimate monitor equipped with multiple antennas
operates in a full-duplex mode, and tries to intercept and decode the signals from two suspicious
communication links concurrently with the assistance of jamming. Specifically, we focus on
characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate region, by optimizing the legitimate monitor’s
jamming transmit covariance matrix under the maximum transmit power constraint. The key
novelty and main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Novel proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious communication links via jamming: To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to characterize the achievable
eavesdropping rate region over two suspicious links via jamming. As the legitimate monitor
cannot hear more than what suspicious links transmit, we define the achievable eavesdrop-
ping rate region as the intersection of the achievable rate region for the suspicious links
and that for the eavesdropping links. The former region can be purposely altered by the
4monitor’s jamming signals, whereas the latter region is fixed when the linear minimum
mean square error (MMSE) receiver is employed at the legitimate monitor.
• Theoretical characterization of the achievable eavesdropping rate region: We obtain the
achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case by theoretically charac-
terizing the achievable rate region for the suspicious links. As both suspicious links’ rates
are affected by the legitimate monitor’s jamming covariance matrix, we jointly analyze
the achievable rate region bounds for both suspicious links. Specifically, we derive the
closed-form expressions of the upper and lower boundary points of the achievable rate
region for the suspicious links. Moreover, we prove that beamforming is indeed the optimal
jamming transmit strategy for the legitimate monitor, and analyze the monotonicity of both
the upper and lower boundary curves. Based on these results, we analytically characterize
the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. In addition, since the
achievable rate region for suspicious links is in general non-convex, we also propose a time-
sharing based jamming strategy to enlarge this region and characterize the corresponding
achievable eavesdropping rate region.
• Enlargement of the achievable eavesdropping rate region via successive interference can-
cellation: We also extend our study to the case in which the legitimate monitor applies a
non-linear MMSE and successive interference cancellation (MMSE-SIC) receiver to decode
the suspicious signals. For this case, we characterize the achievable eavesdropping rate
region by jointly optimizing the time-sharing factor between different decoding orders at
the legitimate monitor. Moreover, we derive the optimal time-sharing factor that is sufficient
to achieve any point in the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver
case.
It is worth pointing out that the scenario of wireless legitimate surveillance over multiple
suspicious links was also considered in [19], where all suspicious links transmit on orthogonal
frequency bands without interfering with each other, and the legitimate monitor has one single
receiver antenna and one single transmit antenna. The design criteria in [19] is to maximize
weighted sum eavesdropping rate. Different from [19], we consider a more complicated multi-
antenna surveillance case and focus on characterizing the entire achievable eavesdropping rate
region by optimizing the jamming transmit covariance matrix.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and
defines the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case. Section III first
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Notation: In this paper, we use boldface lowercase and uppercase letters to denote vectors and
matrices, respectively. For a Hermitian matrixA, AH , Tr (A), and Rank (A) respectively denote
its conjugate transpose, trace and rank, while A  0 means that A is a positive semi-definite
matrix. I denotes an identity matrix with an appropriate dimension. ‖a‖ computes the Euclidean
norm of a complex vector a. For a complex number z, ∠z denotes its phase. For any two sets
R1 and R2, R1 ⊂ R2 (or R1 ⊆ R2) denotes that R1 is a proper subset (or a subset) of R2, and
R1 ∩R2 and R1 ∪R2, denote the intersection and union between R1 and R2, respectively. All
the log (·) functions have base-2 by default.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious communication
links, including one legitimate monitor and two suspicious communication pairs. The suspicious
transmitters (Alice 1 and Alice 2) and receivers (Bob 1 and Bob 2) are each equipped with
one antenna. The legitimate monitor is equipped with Nr receiving antennas for receiving
the suspicious messages and Nt transmitting antennas to send jamming signals for disrupting
suspicious receivers. Both the suspicious transmitters send independent suspicious messages
to their corresponding receivers over the same frequency band simultaneously. The legitimate
6monitor operates in a full-duplex manner, and we assume that the self-interference can be
perfectly canceled by using advanced analog and digital self-interference cancellation schemes
[20]. As will be shown later in Section V, the assumption of perfect self-interference cancellation
is reasonable in our considered scenario.
Let hi,i ∈ C1×1 denote the channel coefficient of the ith suspicious link (from the ith suspicious
transmitter to the ith suspicious receiver, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}), hi,j ∈ C1×1 denote the channel coefficient
of the ith interference link (from the ith suspicious transmitter to the jth suspicious receiver,
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i), and hi,m ∈ CNr×1 denote the channel vector of the ith eavesdropping
link (from the ith suspicious transmitter to the receiver antennas of the legitimate monitor),
respectively. Furthermore, let gi ∈ CNt×1 denote the jamming channel vector from the legitimate
monitor to the ith suspicious receiver. To characterize the fundamental information-theoretic
performance limits of proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious links, we assume that the
legitimate monitor has the perfect channel state information (CSI) of all links. In practice, the
legitimate monitor can acquire the CSI of hi,m and gi by overhearing the pilot signals sent by
suspicious transmitters and suspicious receivers, respectively. On the other hand, it can obtain
the CSI of hi,i and hi,j by eavesdropping the feedback channels of each suspicious transmitter-
receiver pair [8]. We also assume that suspicious transmitters are unaware of the existence of
legitimate monitor and thus they do not employ any anti-eavesdropping or anti-jamming methods
[4]-[6].
The achievable rate of the ith suspicious link is given by
RSi (Q) = log
(
1 +
Pi |hi,i|2
Tr (Qgig
H
i ) + Pj |hj,i|2 + σ2i
)
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (1)
where Q ∈ CNt×Nt denotes the jamming transmit covariance matrix at the legitimate monitor, Pi
is the transmit power of the ith suspicious transmitter, and σ2i denotes the noise power at the ith
suspicious receiver. For notation simplicity, we denote σ˜2i = Pj |hj,i|2 + σ2i , ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
as the effective noise power at the ith suspicious receiver.
We define the achievable rate region for the suspicious links to be the union of all suspicious
rate pairs
(
RS1 (Q) , R
S
2 (Q)
)
over all possible choices of the jamming transmit covariance matrix
Q ∈ Ω. Specifically, in the case without (w/o) time-sharing among different jamming transmit
covariance matrices, the achievable rate region for the suspicious links is given by
RSw/o−TS =
{(
RS1 (Q) , R
S
2 (Q)
) ∣∣∣Q ∈ Ω
}
, (2)
7where Ω = {Q|Q  0,Tr (Q) ≤ Pmax} is the feasible set ofQ, with Pmax denoting the maximum
transmit power at the legitimate monitor. Note that the achievable region RSw/o−TS also depends
on the constant transmission powers, P1 and P2, of the two suspicious transmitters. It is also
worth noting that the set RSw/o−TS is compact because the feasible set Ω is compact and the
mapping from Q to
(
RS1 (Q) , R
S
2 (Q)
)
is continuous.
The MMSE receiver is a linear receiver structure, which optimally trades off capturing the
energy of the desired signal of interest and canceling the unwanted interference [21]. When the
legitimate monitor employs the MMSE receiver to decode different suspicious messages, the
achievable rate of the ith eavesdropping link observed by the legitimate monitor is expressed as
REi = log
(
1 + Pih
H
i,m
(
Pjhj,mh
H
j,m + σ
2
mI
)−1
hi,m
)
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (3)
where σ2m denotes the noise power at the legitimate monitor.
The achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links, denoted by REMMSE, is defined as
the set of all suspicious rate pairs
(
rE1 , r
E
2
)
that can be decodable at the legitimate monitor
simultaneously, i.e.,
REMMSE =
{(
rE1 , r
E
2
) ∣∣∣0 ≤ rE1 ≤ RE1 ; 0 ≤ rE2 ≤ RE2
}
, (4)
which is a rectangle specified by the origin and the three vertices
(
0, RE2
)
,
(
RE1 , 0
)
and
(
RE1 , R
E
2
)
.
The rectangle is fixed when the widely used MMSE receiver is employed at the legitimate
monitor.
It is worth pointing out that the legitimate monitor can successfully decode the suspicious
messages sent by the ith suspicious transmitter if the achievable rate of the ith eavesdropping
link is no smaller than that of the ith suspicious link, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Let x = (rS1 , rS2 ) in (2)
denote any suspicious rate-pair in the set RSw/o−TS, i.e., x ∈ RSw/o−TS. If x falls into the set
REMMSE in (4), i,e, x ∈ REMMSE, the legitimate monitor can decode both links simultaneously.
Otherwise, if the point x is outside the set REMMSE, i.e., x /∈ REMMSE, the legitimate monitor could
not guarantee to successfully decode the two suspicious messages concurrently. Therefore, we
define the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver case as the intersection
of the regions REMMSE and RSw/o−TS, i.e.,
RMMSEw/o−TS = REMMSE ∩RSw/o−TS (5)
In this paper, we are interested in characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate region
RMMSEw/o−TS in (5). Note that since the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links REMMSE
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Fig. 2. An example of the achievable rate region RSw/o−TS for the two suspicious links. The horizontal and vertical axes
represent the achievable rates of Bob 1 and Bob 2, respectively.
in (4) is fixed for the SE receiver case, we can derive the achievable eavesdropping rate
region RMMSEw/o−TS by characterizing the achievable rate region for the suspicious links RSw/o−TS in
(2) only. Therefore, in the sequel, we focus on characterizing the region RSw/o−TS driven by the
jamming transmit covariance matrix Q.
III. THEORETICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF RSw/o−TS
In this section, we focus on characterizing the achievable rate region for the suspicious links
RSw/o−TS. For the ease of exposition, we first give an example of the region RSw/o−TS in Fig. 2
and we will introduce more details later.
Prior to characterizing the achievable region RSw/o−TS, we first need to determine the feasible
intervals of RS1 (Q) and R
S
2 (Q), respectively. Let R
min
1 and R
max
1 denote the minimum and
maximum values of RS1 (Q), and R
min
2 and R
max
2 denote the minimum and maximum values of
RS2 (Q) as shown in Fig. 2. Then, we have the following lemma, which confirms the minimum
and maximum values of RS1 (Q) and R
S
2 (Q), respectively.
Lemma 1: Rmin1 = log
(
1 +
P1|h1,1|
2
Pmax‖g1‖
2+σ˜21
)
, Rmax1 = log
(
1 +
P1|h1,1|
2
σ˜21
)
, Rmin2 = log
(
1 +
P2|h2,2|
2
Pmax‖g2‖
2+σ˜22
)
, and Rmax2 = log
(
1 +
P2|h2,2|
2
σ˜22
)
.
Proof: The minimum value of RS1 (Q) is obtained by solving the optimization problem:
Rmin1 = inQ∈Ω R
S
1 (Q), which has the same optimal solution as the following problem:
max
Q∈Ω
Tr
(
g1g
H
1
)
. (6)
9According to [22, Lemma 1], we know that the optimal solution to problem (6) is QMRT1 =
wMRT1w
H
MRT1, where wMRT1 =
√
Pmax
g1
‖g1‖
is the maximum-ratio transmission (MRT) beam-
former in the direction of g1 with the maximum transmit power Pmax. Thus, we have R
min
1 =
RS1 (QMRT1) = log
(
1 +
P1|h1,1|
2
Pmax‖g1‖
2+σ˜21
)
.
Similarly, we can obtain that Rmin2 = log
(
1 +
P2|h2,2|
2
Pmax‖g2‖
2+σ˜22
)
, which is achievable with the
jamming transmit covariance matrix QMRT2 = wMRT2w
H
MRT2, with wMRT2 =
√
Pmax
g2
‖g2‖
.
Moreover, it is easy to check that both RS1 (Q) and R
S
2 (Q) are maximized when the legitimate
monitor keeps silent and does not send any jamming signals, i,e, Q = 0. Thus, we have Rmax1 =
RS1 (0) = log
(
1 + P1|h1,1|
2
σ˜21
)
, and Rmax2 = R
S
2 (0) = log
(
1 + P2|h2,2|
2
σ˜22
)
.
Note that there exists a rectangle specified by the four vertices
(
Rmin1 , R
min
2
)
,
(
Rmin1 , R
max
2
)
,(
Rmin1 , R
max
2
)
, and (Rmax1 , R
max
2 ), which contains the achievable region RSw/o−TS, as shown in
Fig. 2.
To clearly characterize the achievable region RSw/o−TS, we next propose an efficient approach
to obtain its entire upper and lower boundaries. As illustrated in Fig. 2, for each fixed RS1 (Q) =
R1 ∈
[
Rmin1 , R
max
1
]
at Bob 1, we derive the corresponding maximum and minimum achievable
rates of Bob 2 (denoted by fmax (R1) and fmin (R1), respectively) by solving the following two
optimization problems.
fmax (R1) = max
Q∈Ω
RS2 (Q) s.t. R
S
1 (Q) = R1, (7)
fmin (R1) = min
Q∈Ω
RS2 (Q) s.t. R
S
1 (Q) = R1. (8)
It is worth pointing out that the achievable rate-pairs (R1, fmax (R1)) and (R1, fmin (R1)) are,
respectively, the upper and lower boundary points of the region RSw/o−TS corresponding to any
feasible R1. Hence, we can find all the upper and lower boundary points of RSw/o−TS by sweeping
R1 from R
min
1 to R
max
1 . In the following two subsections, we focus on solving problems (7) and
(8) by determining the jamming transmit covariance matrix Q, respectively.
A. Optimal Solution to Problem (7)
In this subsection, we aim to analytically derive the optimal solution to problem (7) and obtain
the closed-form expression of fmax (R1).
To solve problem (7), we first reformulate it as the following equivalent form
min
Q0
Tr
(
Qg2g
H
2
)
s.t. Tr
(
Qg1g
H
1
)
= φ (R1) ,Tr (Q) ≤ Pmax,
(9)
10
where φ (R1) =
P1|h1,1|
2
2R1−1
− σ˜21 is a nonnegative constant for a fixed R1 ∈
[
Rmin1 , R
max
1
]
.
In fact, problem (9) is a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem, which can be solved
using the existing numerical optimization toolbox such as CVX [23]. However, the numerical
approach cannot provide enough insights on the solution structure. To gain more insights of the
optimal solution, we adopt an analytical approach and first provide the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let Q∗ denote the optimal solution to problem (9), we then have Rank (Q∗) ≤ 1.
Proof: Notice that problem (9) is a separable SDP problem with two constraints besides
Q  0. According to [24, Theorem 3.2], the rank of the optimal solution to problem (9) should
satisfy the inequality constraint: Rank (Q∗) ≤ √2. Thus, we obtain that Rank (Q∗) ≤ 1, which
completes the proof.
According to Lemma 2, we know that beamforming is indeed optimal for the legitimate
monitor to attain the upper boundary points of the region RSw/o−TS. Thus, we can rewrite Q =
wwH with w ∈ CNt×1. Then, problem (9) is transformed to
min
w
∣∣gH2 w∣∣2 s.t. ∣∣gH1 w∣∣2 = φ (R1) , ‖w‖2 ≤ Pmax. (10)
We have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal solution to problem
(10).
Lemma 3: The optimal jamming beamforming vector wopt to problem (10) is in the form of
wopt = αgˆ2 + βgˆ
⊥
2 , where α and β are two complex weights, gˆ2 =
g2
‖g2‖
, gˆ⊥2 =
g⊥2
‖g⊥2 ‖ , with
g⊥2 =
(
I− gˆ2gˆH2
)
g1 denoting the projection of g1 onto the null space of gˆ2.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Lemma 3 tells that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (10) should lie in
the space spanned by gˆ2 and gˆ
⊥
2 , as depicted in Fig. 3. Then, by substituting w = αgˆ2 + βgˆ
⊥
2
into problem (10), it follows that
min
α,β
|α|2 ‖g2‖2
s.t.
∣∣αgH1 gˆ2+βgH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2=φ (R1) , |α|2+|β|2 ≤ Pmax.
(11)
It is observed that the objective function of problem (11) only depends on α and is regardless
of β. Therefore, we need to find the minimum amplitude of α under the condition that the
constraints in problem (11) are not violated. Then, we derive the following theorem, which
provides the closed-form solution to problem (11).
1111
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em 1: to problem (11) is given by
, β ) = gˆ
gˆ if max gˆ
gˆ , ι gˆ otherwise
gˆ gˆ gˆ gˆ max
gˆ gˆ
max
Proof: to Appendix B.
max gˆ in (12) could be re-expressed in terms of as
log 1 +
max gˆ +˜
. Denote ZF2 = log 1 +
max gˆ +˜
. Note that ZF2 is the
value of at the legitimate monitor with the zero-forcing (ZF)
ZF2 max , i.e., transmitting jamming signals in the direction of
power max. Actually,
ZF2 is the minimum value of legitimate
ve without reducing the achievable rate of Bob 2. Therefore, when ZF2
or equivalently max gˆ , jamming signals are sent only in the direction of
ve function of (11), thus yielding the optimal = 0 as shown in Theorem
1. In this case, we also notice that
gˆ
max, which means the legitimate monitor
of the transmit power to send jamming signals. Otherwise, if < RZF2
or equivalently > Pmax gˆ , the legitimate monitor has to send jamming signals in
of power budget for achieving
in = 0 = 0, and max. Accordingly, the achievable
of Bob 2 will be inevitably reduced.
Fig. 3. The geometric explanation of wopt = αgˆ2 + βgˆ
⊥
2 to problem (10).
Theorem 1: The closed-form optimal solution to problem (11) is given by
(α∗, β∗) =


(
0,
√
φ(R1)
|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2 e
−j∠gH1 gˆ
⊥
2
)
, if φ (R1) ≤ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2(
κ∗e−j∠g
H
1 gˆ2 , ι∗e−j∠g
H
1 gˆ
⊥
2
)
, otherwise
(12)
where κ∗ =
|gH1 gˆ2|
√
φ(R1)−|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |
√(|gH1 gˆ2|2+|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2
)
Pmax−φ(R1)
|gH1 gˆ2|2+|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2 and ι
∗ =
√
Pmax − κ∗2 .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
The condition φ (R1) ≤ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 in (12) could be re-expressed in terms of R1 as R1 ≥
log
(
1 +
P1|h1,1|
2
Pmax|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2+σ˜1
)
. Denote RZF21 = log
(
1 +
P1|h1,1|
2
Pmax|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2+σ˜1
)
. Note that RZF21 is the
value of R1 when jamming signals are sent at the legitimate monitor with the zero-forcing (ZF)
beamformer wZF2 =
√
Pmaxgˆ
⊥
2 , i.e., transmitting jamming signals in the direction of gˆ
⊥
2 with the
maximum transmit power Pmax. Actually, R
ZF2
1 is the minimum value of R1 that the legitimate
monitor can achieve without reducing the achievable rate of Bob 2. Therefore, when R1 ≥ RZF21
or equivalently φ (R1) ≤ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, jamming signals are sent only in the direction of gˆ⊥2 for
minimizing the objective function of (11), thus yielding the optimal α∗ = 0 as shown in Theorem
1. In this case, we also notice that |β∗|2 = φ(R1)|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2 ≤ Pmax, which means the legitimate monitor
may only use part of the transmit power to send jamming signals. Otherwise, if R1 < R
ZF2
1
or equivalently φ (R1) > Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, the legitimate monitor has to send jamming signals in
both the directions of gˆ2 and gˆ
⊥
2 with its maximum transmit power budget for achieving R1,
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resulting in α∗ 6= 0, β∗ 6= 0, and |α∗|2 + |β∗|2 = κ∗2 + ι∗2 = Pmax. Accordingly, the achievable
rate of Bob 2 will be inevitably reduced.
By combining Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, we obtain the closed-form optimal solution wopt =
α∗gˆ2+β
∗gˆ⊥2 to problem (10). By substitutingwopt into the objective function of problem (7), we
directly obtain the following theorem, which provides the closed-form expression of fmax (γ1).
Theorem 2: The closed-form expression of fmax (R1) is given by
fmax (R1) =


log
(
1 + P2|h2,2|
2
σ˜22
)
, if R1 ≥ RZF21
log
(
1 +
P2|h2,2|
2
(κ∗)2‖g2‖
2+σ˜22
)
, otherwise
(13)
From Theorem 2, it follows that ifR1 ≥ RZF21 , we have fmax (R1) = Rmax2 = log
(
1 + P2|h2,2|
2
σ˜22
)
,
which indicates the jamming signals sent by the legitimate monitor for reducing the achievable
rate of Bob 1 do not decrease that of Bob 2. Otherwise, if R1 < R
ZF2
1 , then the achievable rate
of Bob 2 will also be reduced by jamming signals.
To examine the characterized region RSw/o−TS more explicitly, next, we further investigate the
monotonicity of fmax (R1). Note that fmax (R1) given in (13) has two cases, and it is equal to
a constant value when R1 ≥ RZF21 . Thus, in the following, we only study the monotonicity of
fmax (R1) over the interval R1 ∈
[
Rmin1 , R
ZF2
1
)
.
Proposition 1: fmax (R1) is an increasing function of R1 ∈
[
Rmin1 , R
ZF2
1
)
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Proposition 1 is also illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be intuitively explained as follows. From
Fig. 3, it is observed that the amplitudes of the projections of wopt onto gˆ1 and gˆ2, i.e.,
∣∣gˆH1 wopt∣∣
and
∣∣gˆH2 wopt∣∣, are both decreasing when rotating wopt anticlockwise from the MRT beamformer
wMRT1 =
√
Pmaxgˆ1 to the zero-forcing (ZF) beamformer wZF2 =
√
Pmaxgˆ
⊥
2 . Consequently, in
this process, the corresponding rates of Bob 1 and Bob 2 are both monotonically increasing.
Thus, Proposition 1 holds.
B. Optimal Solution to Problem (8)
In this subsection, we aim to analytically derive the optimal solution to problem (8) and
provide fmin (R1) in closed-form.
We first equivalently reformulate problem (8) as
max
Q0
Tr
(
Qg2g
H
2
)
s.t. Tr
(
Qg1g
H
1
)
= φ (R1) ,Tr (Q) ≤ Pmax.
(14)
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4. The geometric explanation of opt gˆ gˆ to problem (15).
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can prove that the optimal solution
to problem (14) also satisfies Rank ( . Hence, by rewriting ww , problem (14) is
valently reformulated as
max s.t. max
to Lemma 3, we have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal
to problem (15).
4: vector opt to problem (15) is in the form of
opt gˆ gˆ , where gˆ gˆ gˆ two complex weights.
Proof: is similar to that of Lemma 3, and thus is omitted for brevity.
4 indicates that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (15) should lie
in the space spanned by gˆ gˆ , as depicted in Fig. 4. Note that to make problem (15) easier
to solve, we alternatively adopt gˆ gˆ as a set of orthogonal basis vectors to represent
gˆ gˆ as in Lemma 3. Then, based on Lemma 4, we equivalently rewrite
as
max
µ,ν
gˆ gˆ
s.t. max
We then have the following theorem, which provides the closed-form optimal solution to
expression of min
Fig. 4. The geo etric explanation of wopt = µgˆ1 + νgˆ
⊥
1 to proble (15).
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can prove that the optimal solution
to problem (14) also satisfies Rank (Q∗) ≤ 1. Hence, by rewriting Q = wwH , problem (14) is
equivalently reformulated as
max
w
∣∣gH2 w∣∣2 s.t. ∣∣gH1 w∣∣2 = φ (R1) , ‖w‖2 ≤ Pmax. (15)
Similar to Lemma 3, we have the following lemma, which provides the structure of the optimal
solution to proble (15).
Lemma 4: The optimal jamming beamforming vector wopt to problem (15) is in the form of
wopt = µgˆ1 + νgˆ
⊥
1 , where gˆ
⊥
1 =
g⊥1
‖g⊥1 ‖ , g
⊥
1 =
(
I−gˆ1gˆH1
)
g2, µ and ν are two complex weights.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3, and thus is omitted for brevity.
Lemma 4 indicates that the optimal jamming beamforming vector to problem (15) should lie
in the space spanned by gˆ1 and gˆ
⊥
1 , as depicted in Fig. 4. Note that to make problem (15) easier
to solve, we alternatively adopt gˆ1 and gˆ
⊥
1 as a set of orthogonal basis vectors to represent w,
rather than using gˆ2 and gˆ
⊥
2 as in Lemma 3. Then, based on Lemma 4, we equivalently rewrite
problem (15) as
max
µ,ν
∣∣µgH2 gˆ1 + νgH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣2
s.t. |µ|2 ‖g1‖2 = φ (R1) , |µ|2 + |ν|2 ≤ Pmax.
(16)
We then have the following theorem, which provides the closed-form optimal solution to
problem (16) and the closed-form expression of fmin (R1).
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Theorem 3: The closed-form optimal solution to problem (16) is
µ∗ =
√
φ (R1)
‖g1‖2
e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ1 , ν∗ =
√
Pmax − φ (R1)‖g1‖2
e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ
⊥
1 ,
and the resulting optimal value of problem (8) is given by
fmin (R1) = log
(
1 +
P2 |h2,2|2(|µ∗| |gH2 gˆ1|+ |ν∗| ∣∣gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣)2 + σ˜22
)
. (17)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
From Theorem 3, we observe that |µ∗|2 + |ν∗|2 = Pmax, which means the legitimate monitor
needs to use its full transmit power to send jamming signals for minimizing the achievable rate
of Bob 2 given the achievable rate requirement of Bob 1.
Similar to Proposition 1, we have the following proposition, whose proof is omitted for brevity.
This proposition reveals the monotonicity of fmin (R1) in (17).
Proposition 2: fmin (R1) is decreasing in R1 ∈
[
Rmin1 , R
MRT2
1
]
, and is increasing in R1 ∈(
RMRT21 , R
max
1
]
, where RMRT21 = log
(
1 +
P2|h2,2|
2
Pmax|gH1 gˆ2|2+σ˜22
)
.
Proposition 2 is also illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be intuitively explained as follows. It is
observed from Fig. 4 that the amplitude of the projection of wopt onto gˆ1, i.e.,
∣∣gˆH1 wopt∣∣,
is decreasing when rotating wopt anticlockwise from the MRT beamformer wMRT1 to the ZF
beamformer wZF1 =
√
Pmaxgˆ
⊥
1 . In this process, the achievable rate of Bob 1 is thus increasing.
However, with the rotation of wopt from wMRT1 to wZF1, the amplitude of the projection of wopt
onto gˆ2, i.e.,
∣∣gˆH2 wopt∣∣, is first increasing and then decreasing. Therefore, the resulting achievable
rate of Bob 2 is first decreasing and then increasing. Hence, Proposition 2 is established.
C. Characterizing RSw/o−TS
In the previous two subsections, we have successfully derived the closed-form expressions of
fmax (R1) and fmin (R1). Thus, the achievable upper and lower boundary points (R1, fmax (R1))
and (R1, fmin (R1)) of the region RSw/o−TS (corresponding to any feasible R1) are obtained for
Fig. 2. Next, we further study whether any point within the two upper and lower boundary points
is achievable. Let IR1 denote the line segment connecting these two boundary points. We then
have the following proposition, which verifies that any point on IR1 is achievable and provides
the required jamming beamforming vector.
Proposition 3: Let (R1, R2) be an arbitrary point on the line segment IR1 , i.e., fmin (R1) ≤
R2 ≤ fmax (R1). Then, the point (R1, R2) is achievable with the jamming beamforming vector
15
wopt = ε
∗
1gˆ1 + ε
∗
2gˆ
⊥
1 , with ε
∗
1 =
√
φ(R1)
‖g1‖
2 e
−j∠gH2 gˆ1 and ε∗2 =
√
φ(R2)−|ε∗1||gH2 gˆ1|
|gH2 gˆ⊥1 | e
−j∠gH2 gˆ
⊥
1 , where
φ (R2) =
P2|h2,2|
2
2R2−1
− σ˜22 .
Proof: The minimum jamming transmit power required to attain the point (R1, R2) is the
optimal value of the following optimization problem
min
Q0
Tr (Q) s.t. RS1 (Q) = R1, R
S
2 (Q) = R2. (18)
Following the same steps as in the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, it is easy to verify that
beamforming is the optimal jamming transmit strategy (i.e., Q = wwH) and the optimal
beamforming solution wopt is in the form of wopt = ε1gˆ2 + ε1gˆ
⊥
2 . Accordingly, problem (18) is
equivalently reformulated as
min
ε1,ε2
|ε1|2 + |ε2|2
s.t. |ε1|2 ‖g1‖2=φ (R1) ,
∣∣ε1gH2 gˆ1+ε2gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣2=φ (R2) ,
(19)
where φ (R2) =
P2|h2,2|
2
2R2−1
− σ˜22 .
Then, similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the optimal solution to problem (19) is given by
ε∗1=
√
φ (R1)
‖g1‖2
e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ1, ε∗2=
√
φ (R2)−|ε∗1|
∣∣gH2 gˆ1∣∣∣∣gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣ e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ
⊥
1 .
Moreover, considering fmin (R1) ≤ R2 and according to (17), we have φ (R2) ≤
( |µ∗| ∣∣gH2 gˆ1∣∣+
|ν∗| ∣∣gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣ )2. Therefore, we can verify that |ε∗1|2+ |ε∗2|2 ≤ |µ∗|2+ |ν∗|2 = Pmax. Thus, the point
(R1, R2) is achievable within a given jamming power budget Pmax.
Remark 1: According to Proposition 3, we know that each point on the line segment IR1 is
achievable. Hence, the entire achievable region RSw/o−TS can be obtained by sweeping R1 from
Rmin1 to R
max
1 .
D. Characterizing RSw/−TS and RMMSEw/−TS
In the previous subsections, we have characterized the achievable rate region RSw/o−TS and
analyzed the monotonicity of its boundary curves. As the region RSw/o−TS is in general non-
convex, in this subsection, we propose a time-sharing-based jamming strategy to further enlarge
this region. Specifically, the jamming transmission is divided into two orthogonal time slots
and the legitimate monitor is allowed to adopt different jamming beamforming vectors within
different time slot.
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LetRSw/−TS denote the achievable rate region for the suspicious links with time-sharing among
different jamming beamforming vectors, then we have
RSw/−TS=
⋃
0≤τ≤1
(R1,R2)∈RSw/o−TS
(R′1,R′2)∈RSw/o−TS
(τR1+(1−τ)R′1, τR2+(1−τ)R′2) , (20)
where (R1, R2) and (R
′
1, R
′
2) are any two rate-pairs in RSw/o−TS, and achievable by the jamming
beamforming vectors w1 and w
′
1, respectively.
Notice that any point on the segment connecting (R1, R2) and (R
′
1, R
′
2) is achievable by time-
sharing based jamming strategy. This is because, if the legitimate monitor uses the jamming
beamforming vector w1 during 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 portion of each block time and the jamming
beamforming vector w′1 during the rest 1 − τ portion of each block time, then the achievable
rate-pair (τR1+(1−τ)R′1, τR2+(1−τ)R′2) is achievable. Therefore, by adjusting the value of
τ , any point on the segment connecting these two points is achievable.
Note that the region RSw/−TS is essentially obtained from the convex hull operation over
the region RSw/o−TS, thus we have RSw/o−TS ⊆ RSw/−TS, where the equality holds if and only if
RSw/o−TS is a convex set. In other words, when the region RSw/o−TS is non-convex, the achievable
rate region for the suspicious links can be further enlarged by time-sharing based jamming
strategy.
Then, similar to (5), we define the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE receiver
case with time-sharing based jamming strategy as the intersection of the regions REMMSE and
RSw/−TS, i.e.,
RMMSEw/−TS = REMMSE ∩ RSw/−TS. (21)
It is easy to verify that RMMSEw/o−TS ⊆ RMMSEw/−TS since RSw/o−TS ⊆ RSw/−TS. Therefore, the time-
sharing based jamming strategy has the potential to enlarge the achievable eavesdropping rate
region in general.
IV. EXTENSION TO MMSE-SIC RECEIVER CASE
In this section, we extend our study for characterizing the achievable eavesdropping rate
region from the linear MMSE receiver in Section II to the non-linear MMSE-SIC receiver.
To be specific, we first describe the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links with
the MMSE-SIC receiver, which is always larger than that with the MMSE receiver. Then, we
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5. An illustrative example of the achievable rate region MMSE SIC two eavesdropping links at the monitor.
vable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver and analyze
to achieve any point within this region.
of MMSE-SIC is for the monitor to decode one suspicious message
MMSE receiver first, and then subtract it from the received signal before decoding the other
= [ , pi vector: the message of the
suspicious link is decoded first, and its effect is then removed from the received signal.
, the achievable rates of the eavesdropping links are respectively
given by
,pi
= log 1 + ,m ,m ,m ,m
,pi
= log 1 +
,m ,m
For example, if the legitimate monitor decodes the message of the first suspicious link first,
= 1 = 2, then the achievable rates of the first and second eavesdropping links
explicitly written as [1 2] = log 1 + ,m ,m ,m ,m [1 2]
log 1 + ,m
,m
, respectively. Notice that thanks to the cancellation of interference from
1 for Bob 2’s reception, we have [1 2] > R[2 1], as shown in Fig. 5. Similarly, we also
have [2 1] > R[1 2]
[1 2] [2 1] vable rate regions for the suspicious links associated with
= [1 2] = [2 1], respectively, which are two rectangular regions and
given by (as shown in Fig. 5)
[1 2] , R [1 2]; 0 [1 2]
Fig. 5. An illustrative example of the achievable rate region REMMSE−SIC for the two eavesdropping links at the monitor.
characterize the achievable eavesdropping rate region for the SE-SIC receiver and analyze
the required scheme to achieve any point within this region.
The fundamental principle of SE-SIC is for the onitor to decode one suspicious essage
with SE receiver first, and then subtract it fro the received signal before decoding the other
suspicious message [25]. Let pi [pi1, pi2] denote the decoding order vector: the essage of the
pi1-th suspicious link is decoded first, and its e fect is then re oved fro the received signal.
Consequently, the achievable rates of the pi1-th and pi2-th eavesdropping links are respectively
given by
Rpi1[pi1,pi2] log
(
1 Ppi1h
H
pi1,m
(
Ppi2hpi2,mh
H
pi2,m
+ σ2mI
)−1
hpi1,m
)
, (22)
Rpi2[pi1,pi2] log
(
1
Ppi2h
H
pi2,m
hpi2,m
σ2m
)
. (23)
For exa ple, if the legitimate onitor decodes the essage of the first suspicious link first,
i.e., pi1 1 and pi2 2, then the achievable rates of the first and second eavesdropping links
are explicitly written as R1[1,2] log
(
1 P1h
H
1,m
(
P2h2,mh
H
2,m + σ
2
mI
)−1
h1,m
)
and R2[1,2] =
log
(
1
P2hH2,mh2,m
σ2m
)
, respectively. Notice that thanks to the cancellation of interference fro
Alice 1 for Bob 2’s reception, we have R2[1,2]
2
[2,1], as shown in Fig. 5. Si ilarly, we also
have R1[2,1]
1
[1,2].
Let RE[1,2] and RE[2,1] denote the achievable rate regions for the suspicious links associated with
decoding orders pi [1, 2] and pi [2, 1], respectively, which are two rectangular regions and
given by (as shown in Fig. 5)
RE[1,2] =
{(
RE1 , R
E
2
) ∣∣∣0 ≤ RE1 ≤ R1[1,2]; 0 ≤ RE2 ≤ R2[1,2]
}
, (24)
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RE[2,1] =
{(
RE1 , R
E
2
) ∣∣∣0 ≤ RE1 ≤ R1[2,1]; 0 ≤ RE2 ≤ R2[2,1]
}
. (25)
Note that the regions RE[1,2] and RE[2,1] are achievable with the decoding orders pi = [1, 2] and
pi = [2, 1], respectively. By allowing the legitimate monitor to arbitrarily choose the decoding
order and employ time-sharing between these two decoding orders, the achievable region for the
eavesdropping links can be characterized by (as shown in Fig. 5)
REMMSE−SIC = Conv
(
RE[1,2]
⋃
RE[2,1]
)
, (26)
where Conv (S) denotes the convex hull of the set S.
The region RETS in Fig. 5 is added thanks to the operation of time-sharing between different
decoding orders. A =
(
R1[2,1], R
2
[2,1]
)
and B =
(
R1[1,2], R
2
[1,2]
)
are two corner points corresponding
the decoding orders pi = [2, 1] and pi = [1, 2], respectively. Any point D =
(
RE1 , R
E
2
)
, with
RE1 ∈
[
R1[1,2], R
1
[2,1]
]
and RE2 ∈
[
R2[2,1], R
2
[1,2]
]
, on the line segment connecting the points A
and B is achievable by employing the time-sharing between the two decoding orders, with the
following adjustable time-sharing factor:
ς
(
RE1
)
=
R1[2,1] −RE1
R1[2,1] − R1[1,2]
. (27)
That is, the legitimate monitor uses the decoding order pi = [1, 2] during the first ς
(
RE1
)
proportion of each time slot and the other decoding order pi = [2, 1] during the rest 1− ς (RE1 )
proportion of each time slot. Specifically, A and B can be regarded as two specifical points
corresponding the two time-sharing factors ς
(
R1[2,1]
)
= 0 and ς
(
R1[1,2]
)
= 1, respectively.
Accordingly, the triangular region RETS below the line segment AB is achievable by using the
time-sharing between different decoding orders. In Fig. 5, any interior point D
′
in RETS is also
achievable with the same time-sharing factor as ς
(
RE1
)
.
Then, similar to the definition of RMMSEw/o−TS in (5), we define the achievable eavesdropping rate
region for the MMSE-SIC receiver case without time-sharing among different jamming transmit
covariance matrices as1
RMMSE−SICw/o−TS = REMMSE−SIC ∩ RSw/o−TS. (28)
1Note that similar to the definition of RMMSEw/−TS in (21), we can also define the achievable eavesdropping rate region for
the MMSE-SIC receiver case with time-sharing among different jamming transmit covariance matrices as RMMSE−SIC
w/−TS =
R
E
MMSE−SIC ∩R
S
w/−TS. Since R
S
w/o−TS ⊆ R
S
w/−TS, we have R
MMSE−SIC
w/o−TS ⊆ R
MMSE−SIC
w/−TS .
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6. System setup for simulation.
MMSE-SIC receiver yields larger achievable rate region for the eavesdrop-
by the MMSE receiver, i.e., MMSE ⊆ RMMSE SIC, we have
MMSE
TS
MMSE SIC
TS
, we discuss the scheme for the legitimate monitor to achieve any point in MMSE SICTS
= ( , R ∈ RMMSE SICTS . It is necessary for the legitimate monitor to jointly choose
factor between different decoding orders as well as the jamming beamforming
vector so as to guarantee ∈ RMMSE SIC ∈ R TS . While the jamming
is already analyzed and given in Section IV, we only need to update the time-
factor of decoding orders for MMSE SIC region only, as given by
if ∈ R[1 2]
) in if ∈ RTS
if ∈ R[2 1]
V. NUMERICAL ESULTS
In this section, we present numerical examples to show the achievable eavesdropping rate
regions by our proactive jamming approach. We consider the two-dimensional (2D) Cartesian
X and Y axes on the ground plane shown in Fig. 6, where Alice 1,
2, Bob 1, and Bob 2 are respectively located at (0 0) (0 200 meters) (100 meters 0)
(100 meters 200 meters), and = ( , y of the legitimate monitor.
We adopt the distance-dependent pass loss model, which is given by
Fig. 6. System setup for simulation.
Note that since the MSE-SIC receiver yields larger achievable rate region for the eavesdrop-
ping links than that by the SE receiver, i.e., REMMSE ⊆ REMMSE−SIC, we have RMMSEw/o−TS ⊆
RMMSE−SICw/o−TS .
Finally, we discu s the scheme for the legitimate monitor to achieve any point in RMMSE−SICw/o−TS ,
i.e., ∀z = (Rz1, Rz2) ∈ RMMSE−SICw/o−TS . It is nece sary for the legitimate monitor to jointly choose
the time-sharing factor between different decoding orders as well as the jamming beamforming
vector so as to guarantee z ∈ REMMSE−SIC and z ∈ RSw/o−TS concurrently. hile the jamming
beamforming is already analyzed and given in Section IV, we only need to update the time-
sharing factor of decoding orders for REMMSE−SIC region only, as given by
ς∗ =


0, if z ∈ RE[1,2]
ς (Rz1) in (27), if z ∈ RETS
1, if z ∈ RE[2,1]
. (29)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical examples to show the achievable eavesdropping rate
regions by our proactive jamming approach. e consider the two-dimensional (2D) Cartesian
coordinate system with X and Y axes on the ground plane shown in Fig. 6, where Alice 1,
Alice 2, Bob 1, and Bob 2 are respectively located at (0, 0), (0, 200 meters), (100 meters, 0),
and (100 meters, 200 meters), and M = (xi, yj) denotes the location of the legitimate monitor.
e adopt the distance-dependent pa s lo s model, which is given by
20
Fig. 7. The achievable eavesdropping rate regions for the case of MMSE receiver with different jamming transmit power budgets
at the legitimate monitor. (a) Pmax = 4 dBm. (b) Pmax = 20 dBm.
L = A0
(
d
d0
)−α
, (30)
where A0 = 10
−3, d denotes the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, d0 = 1 meter
is a reference distance, and α = 2.5 is the path loss exponent. All the channels are randomly
generated from independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading with zero mean
and variance specified by (30). Unless otherwise stated, the numbers of transmitting and receiving
antennas at the legitimate monitor are set to Nt = Nr = 2. We set the maximum transmit power
at the suspicious transmitters as P1 = P2 = 10 dBm, and the noise power at each receiver as
σ2 = −70 dBm. All the results are obtained by averaging over 10,000 independent channel
realizations.
A. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with MMSE Receiver.
First, we examine the achievable eavesdropping rate regions for the case of MMSE receiver
with different jamming transmit power budgets at the legitimate monitor, i.e., Pmax = 4 dBm or
Pmax = 20 dBm, where the legitimate monitor is located at M = (100 meters, 100 meters). In
Fig. 7 the rectangle area with vertex C denotes the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping
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links REMMSE. The point O corresponds to the achievable rate pair of passive eavesdropping
without jamming. In Fig. 7, the point O is outside the region REMMSE, which tells that the passive
eavesdropping cannot help the legitimate monitor eavesdrop any suspicious link. Furthermore,
the irregular area with vertex O represents the achievable rate region for the suspicious links
RSw/o−TS, achieved by the jamming-assisted proactive eavesdropping approach. From Fig. 7, we
can see that with larger jamming transmit power budget, the legitimate monitor can use jamming
to further decrease the rates of suspicious links, allowing the legitimate monitor to decode both
suspicious links’ data successfully. For example, the achievable rate region of the suspicious
links RSw/o−TS in Fig. 7(a) is much smaller than that in Fig. 7(b). Specifically, the intersection
of the region RSw/o−TS with the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links REMMSE is an
empty set in Fig. 7(a), and thus the legitimate monitor cannot eavesdrop any suspicious link;
whereas the intersection of the regions RSw/o−TS and REMMSE is RMMSEw/o−TS thanks to the stronger
jamming, shown as the shaded area in Fig. 7(b).
Next, we study the impact of the legitimate monitor’s location on the achievable eavesdropping
rate region with M = (50 meters, 70 meters) and M = (50 meters, 130 meters), respectively.
The jamming transmit power is set to be Pmax = 20 dBm. From Fig. 8(a), we can see that
the achievable rate region for the eavesdropping links REMMSE is a wide rectangle area, i.e.,
RE1 > R
E
2 . This is due to the fact that when M = (50 meters, 70 meters), the legitimate
monitor is closer to Alice 1 than to Alice 2 so that the first eavesdropping link experiences
the minimal distance-dependent signal attenuation and co-channel interference caused by the
second suspicious transmitter. From Fig. 8(a), we can also observe that the legitimate monitor
can eavesdrop the first suspicious link successfully even without sending any jamming signals,
i.e., RE1 > R
S
1 (0), yet cannot overhear from the second suspicious link. Our jamming-assisted
approach targets at the rate reduction of the second suspicious link, helping the legitimate monitor
overhear both the suspicious links. On the other hand, when the legitimate monitor is located at
M = (50 meters, 130 meters), it is closer to Alice 2 than to Alice 1. Thus, from Fig. 8(b), we
can see that in this case REMMSE is a tall rectangle area (i.e., R
E
1 < R
E
2 ) and the legitimate monitor
can eavesdrop the second suspicious link successfully without sending any jamming signals (i.e.,
RE2 > R
S
2 (0)), yet cannot overhear from the first suspicious link. Our jamming-assisted approach
aims at reducing the first suspicious link’s rate, and thus helps the legitimate monitor overhear
both the suspicious links successfully. Furthermore, it can be observed from Figs. 8(a) and 8(b)
that time-sharing between different jamming beamforming vectors can enlarge the achievable
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(a) Legitimate monitor’s location at M = (50 meters, 70 meters).
(b) Legitimate monitor’s location at M = (50 meters, 130 meters).
Fig. 8. The achievable eavesdropping rate regions with different locations of the legitimate monitor.
rate region of the suspicious links over the case without time sharing, i.e., RSw/o−TS ⊂ RSw/−TS,
which further results in a larger achievable eavesdropping rate region, i.e., RMMSEw/o−TS ⊂ RMMSEw/−TS.
Furthermore, we show the impact of the number of jamming antennas Nt on the achievable
eavesdropping rate region with Nt = 2 and Nt = 5, respectively. The legitimate monitor is locatd
at M = (100 meters, 100 meters), and the jamming transmit power budget is set as Pmax = 20
dBm. Comparing Figs. 9(a) and 9(b), we can clearly see that the achievable eavesdropping rate
region is significantly enlarged as the number of jamming antennas Nt increases from 2 to 5.
This is because, as Nt increases, the legitimate monitor has more degrees of freedom in spatial
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Fig. 9. The achievable eavesdropping rate region versus Nt. (a) Nt = 2. (b) Nt = 5.
domain to design jamming transmit covariance matrix, which enhances the jamming performance
and thus enlarges the achievable rate region of suspicious links RSw/o−TS.
B. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with MMSE-SIC Receiver
In Fig. 10, we compare the achievable eavesdropping rate regions for both MMSE and MMSE-
SIC receiver cases under different locations of the legitimate monitor, i.e., M =
(
100 meters,
100 meters
)
and M = (0, 100 meters), respectively. The monitor’s jamming transmit power is
set to Pmax = 20 dBm. As we can see from Fig. 10, the achievable eavesdropping rate region
for the MMSE-SIC receiver case RMMSE−SICw/o−TS is significantly larger than that for the MMSE
receiver case RMMSEw/o−TS, i.e., R
MMSE
w/o−TS ⊂ RMMSE−SICw/o−TS . This is because of the joint operations of
SIC and time-sharing between two decoding orders at the legitimate receiver for improving both
the eavesdropping links. Furthermore, comparing Figs. 10(a) and 10(b), we can observe that the
achievable eavesdropping rate regions for the MMSE receiver case are enlarged by moving the
location of the legitimate monitor fromM = (100 meters, 100 meters) toM = (0, 100 meters).
Meanwhile, during this process, the difference between the achievable rate regions REMMSE and
REMMSE−SIC becomes large, i.e., the value of ∆R
S
1 increases approximately from 0.35 bits per
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(a) Legitimate monitor’s location at M = (100 meters, 100 meters).
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
R1
S
 (b/s/Hz)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
R
2S  
(b/
s/H
z)
R
w/o-TS
S
RMMSE
E
RMMSE-SIC
E
R
w/o-TS
MMSE
R
w/o-TS
MMSE-SIC
B
A
C
O
R1
S
(b) Legitimate monitor’s location at M = (0, 100 meters).
Fig. 10. The achievable eavesdropping rate regions for both the cases of MMSE and MMSE-SIC receiver under different
locations of the legitimate monitor.
second per hertz (b/s/Hz) to 0.85 b/s/Hz. This is due to the fact that when M = (0, 100 meters),
the legitimate monitor is in a strong co-channel interference environment from both Alice 1 and
Alice 2, and thus the performance advantage of the MMSE-SIC receiver is more significant.
C. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate Region with Imperfect Self-Interference Cancellation
In this subsection, we provide numerical results to show the impact of imperfect self-interference
cancellation on the eavesdropping performance of our proposed solutions. Particularly, we focus
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on evaluating the effect of imperfect self-interference cancellation on the achievable eavesdrop-
ping rate region of the MMSE receiver case.
To begin, for the case with imperfect self-interference cancellation, the achievable rate of the
ith eavesdropping link is modified from (3) as REi (Q) = log
(
1+
Pih
H
i,mhi,m
ρTr(HeeQHHee)+Pjhj,mh
H
j,m+σ
2
mI
)
, ∀i, j ∈
{1, 2}, i 6= j, where Hee ∈ CNr×Nt denotes the feedback loop channel between the transmitter
antennas and the receiver antennas of the legitimate monitor, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the self-interference
cancellation coefficient, which represents the degree of passive self-interference suppression, i.e.,
ρ = 0 means perfect self-interference cancellation. LetA denote the set of all jamming covariance
matrices Q required to achieve the regionRSw/o−TS defined in (2). Then, the minimum achievable
rate rate of the ith eavesdropping link with imperfect self-interference cancellation, denoted by
RSIi , is given by R
SI
i = min∀Q∈AR
E
i (Q) , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. By replacing REi in (4) with RSIi for
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, we obtain an achievable (lower-bound) rate region for the eavesdropping links with
imperfect self-interference cancellation and denote it as RE−SIMMSE. Then, we can further obtain
the achievable eavesdropping rate region with imperfect self-interference cancellation, denoted
by RMMSE−SIw/o−TS , by replacing REMMSE in (5) with RE−SIMMSE.
For comparison, we also consider a heuristic null space-based jamming beamforming design
and show the corresponding achievable eavesdropping rate region, denoted by RMMSE−NSw/o−TS . In
this design, the jamming covariance matrix is chosen such that HeeQH
H
ee = 0, i.e., jamming
signals are sent in the null space of the feedback loop channel matrix Hee, thus leading to no
self-interference regardless of the value of ρ. Let V ∈ CNt×(Nt−r) denote the orthogonal basis
of the null space of Hee, with r being the rank of Hee. Then, the jamming covariance matrix
Q can be expressed as Q = VQ¯VH , where Q¯ is a (Nt − r)× (Nt − r) positive semi-definite
matrix. By substituting Q = VQ¯VH into (1) and after defining g˜i = V
Hgi, we can use the
same approach as in previous Section III to design Q¯ and then characterize the achievable region
RMMSE−NSw/o−TS . Moreover, we note that the orthogonal basis V can be determined from the singular
value decomposition of Hee (following the same approach in [8]). It is also worth pointing out
that the above null space-based jamming design works only when Nt > r. Obviously, since
r ≤ min {Nt, Nr}, a sufficient condition for Nt > r to hold is that Nt > Nr, i.e., the legitimate
monitor allocates more antennas at its transmitter than that at its receiver.
In Figs. 11(a) and 11(b), we show the impact of self-interference on our proposed solution
under different self-interference cancellation coefficients, i.e., ρ = −75 dB and ρ = −55 dB,
respectively, while in Figs. 11(c) and 11(d), we plot the achievable eavesdropping rate region
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Fig. 11. Comparison of achievable eavesdropping rate regions of our proposed solutions with and without perfect self-imperfect
cancellation. (a) Nt = 5, ρ = −75 dB; (b) Nt = 5, ρ = −55 dB; (c) Nt = 5, ρ = −55 dB; (d) Nt = 7, ρ = −55 dB.
of the null space-based jamming design with Nt = 5 and Nt = 7, respectively. The legitimate
monitor is location at M = (100 meters, 100 meters), and the jamming transmit power budget
is set to be Pmax = 20 dBm. From Fig. 11(a), we can clearly see that the region RMMSE−SIw/o−TS is
just slightly smaller than the region RMMSEw/o−TS (obtained by perfect self-interference cancellation).
This observation suggests that ignoring the self-interference will not significantly degrade the
eavesdropping performance if the self-interference cancellation coefficient is small enough, i.e.
ρ ≤ −75 dB. Please note that the jointly analog and digital self-interference cancellation
technique (recently reported in [20]) is able to achieve up to 110 dB self-interference reduction,
i.e., ρ = −110 dB. Thus, it is reasonable to ignore the self-interference when legitimate monitor
adopts this advanced self-interference cancellation technique. Of course, if ρ increases to a huge
level, e.g., −55 dB in Fig. 11(b), then the region RMMSE−SIw/o−TS is significantly smaller than the
region RMMSEw/o−TS. In this case, the legitimate monitor may choose the null space-based jamming
strategy to send jamming signals in order to obtain better eavesdropping performance. This
is because, from Figs. 11(b) and 11(c), it can be observed that the null space-based jamming
design achieves better eavesdropping rate region than our proposed solution with imperfect self-
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interference cancellation. Furthermore, comparing Figs. 11(c) and 11(d), we observe that the
achievable eavesdropping rate region of the null space-based jamming design is significantly
enlarged as the number of jamming antennas Nt increases from 5 to 7. This is due to the fact
that, as Nt increases, the legitimate monitor has more degrees of freedom in the null space of
Hee to design jamming transmit covariance matrix, thus making it more capable of changing
the achievable rate of suspicious links (i.e., increasing the corresponding achievable rate region
of suspicious links, denoted by RS−NSw/o−TS).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the proactive eavesdropping over two suspicious communication
links scenario. Specifically, we first characterized the achievable eavesdropping rate region for
the MMSE receiver case with or without time sharing the jamming transmit covariance matrix.
For this purpose, we derived the closed-form expressions of the upper and lower boundary
points of the achievable rate region for the two suspicious links and analyzed the monotonicity
of the upper and lower boundary curves. Furthermore, we extended our study to the MMSE-
SIC receiver case and characterized the corresponding achievable eavesdropping rate region, by
jointly optimizing the time-sharing factor. Simulation results showed that significant performance
gain is achieved with the proactive eavesdropping over the passive eavesdropping, and the
achievable eavesdropping rate region for the MMSE-SIC receiver case is notably larger than that
for the MMSE receiver case, especially when the legitimate monitor is in a strong co-channel
interference environment.
There are several directions to study beyond this work in the future. For example, how to extend
the model of two suspicious communication links to multiple links is an unsolved problem, while
considering the more advanced transmitters/receivers of the suspicious links (e.g., with multiple
antennas) will make the problem more challenging. For example, if the suspicious users are able
to detect the jamming attack, they may adopt anti-jamming methods such as random frequency
hopping to avoid jamming. In this case, how to study the interplay between the legitimate monitor
and suspicious users is an interesting open problem.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let g⊥2 denote the projection of g1 into the null space of gˆ2, i.e., g
⊥
2 =
(
I− gˆ2gˆH2
)
g1.
Thus, gˆ⊥2 and gˆ2 are two orthonormal vectors, where gˆ
⊥
2 =
g⊥2
‖g⊥2 ‖ . Then, we can define a matrix
Π =
[
gˆ2 gˆ
⊥
2 Π⊥
]
, withΠ⊥ ∈ CNt×(Nt−2) being the orthogonal complement of
[
gˆ2 gˆ
⊥
2
]
. Thus,Π
is a unitary matrix, i.e., ΠHΠ = I, with columns spanning the Nt-dimensional space. Therefore,
any jamming beamforming vector w can be expressed as
w =
[
gˆ2 gˆ
⊥
2 Π⊥
]


α
β
z

 , (31)
where α ∈ C, β ∈ C, and z ∈ C(Nt−2)×1.
Using the fact that gH1 Π⊥=g
H
2 Π⊥ = 0, and g
H
2 gˆ
⊥
2 = 0, we have
gH1 w = αg
H
1 gˆ2 + βg
H
1 gˆ
⊥
2 , (32)
gH2 w = α ‖g2‖ . (33)
By substituting (32) and (33) into problem (10), we can express it alternatively as
min
α,β,z
|α|2 ‖g2‖2
s.t.
∣∣αgH1 gˆ2 + βgH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 = φ (R1)
|α|2 + |β|2 + ‖z‖2 ≤ Pmax
(34)
It is obvious that z has no influence on both the objective function and the first constraint in
problem (34), but only consumes power budget Pmax. Therefore, z should be set to zero so as to
enlarge the feasible set. Thus, the optimal jamming vector w has the form of w = αgˆ2 + βgˆ
⊥
2 ,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We convert the complex numbers gH1 gˆ2 and g
H
1 gˆ
⊥
2 into their complex exponential forms
such that gH1 gˆ2 =
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣ ej∠gH1 gˆ2 and gH1 gˆ⊥2 = ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣ ej∠gH1 gˆ⊥2 , and express the optimization
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variables α and β as α = κej∠α and β = ιej∠β, respectively, where κ, ι ≥ 0. Then, problem (11)
can be equivalently transformed as
min
κ≥0,ι≥0,∠α,∠β
κ2 ‖g2‖2
s.t.
∣∣∣κ ∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣ ej(∠α+∠gH1 gˆ2) + ι ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣ ej(∠β+∠gH1 gˆ⊥2 )∣∣∣2 = φ (R1) ,
κ2 + ι2 ≤ Pmax.
(35)
Applying the triangle inequality to the left hand side (LHS) of the first constraint in problem
(35), which yields∣∣∣κ ∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣ ej(∠α+∠gH1 gˆ2) + ι ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣ ej(∠β+∠gH1 gˆ⊥2 )∣∣∣2 ≤ (κ ∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣+ ι ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣)2 , (36)
where the equality holds when ∠α + ∠gH1 gˆ2 = ∠β + ∠g
H
1 gˆ
⊥
2 = θ with θ being any phase.
Notice that the phases ∠α and ∠β only appear in the first constraint of problem (35), and the
feasible set of κ, ι in problem (35) can be enlarged if the LHS of the first constraint in problem
(35) is replaced by the right hand side (RHS) of (36). Therefore, the optimal phases ∠α∗ and
∠β∗ should guarantee that the equality in (36) can be achieved. Without loss of generality, let
θ = 0, then we have
∠α∗ = −∠gH1 gˆ2, and ∠β∗ = −∠gH1 gˆ⊥2 . (37)
Substituting (37) into problem (35), which can be simplified as
min
κ≥0,ι≥0
κ2 ‖g2‖2
s.t.
(
κ
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣+ ι ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣)2 = φ (R1) ,
κ2 + ι2 ≤ Pmax.
(38)
We observe that the objective function of problem (38) is only related to the optimization
variable κ. Then, to solve problem (38), we need to find the minimum κ under the condition
that the constraints of problem (38) are satisfied. Obviously, the minimum value of κ is zero,
i.e., κ∗ = 0, which can be achieved if the following problem has a feasible solution given by ι.
find ι
s.t. ι2
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 = φ (R1) , ι2 ≤ Pmax. (39)
It is easy to verify that problem (39) is feasible if and only if φ (R1) ≤ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, and the
corresponding optimal solution to problem (39) is ι∗ =
√
φ(R1)
|gH1 gˆ⊥2 |2 . Therefore, we can conclude
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that, if the condition φ (R1) ≤ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 is satisfied, the optimal solutions to problem (11)
are
α∗ = κ∗ej∠α
∗
= 0, (40)
β∗ = ι∗ej∠β
∗
=
√
φ (R1)∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 e
−j∠gH1 gˆ
⊥
2 . (41)
In what follows, we focus on solving problem (38) for the case that φ (R1) > Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2.
By contradiction, it is easy to verify that if φ (R1) > Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, then the optimal solution
to problem (38) should satisfy κ∗
2
+ ι∗
2
= Pmax. Thus, in this case, problem (38) is equivalent
to the following problem.
min
κ≥0,ι≥0
κ2 ‖g2‖2
s.t.
(
κ
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣ + ι ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣)2 = φ (R1) ,
κ2 + ι2 = Pmax.
(42)
Using the relation ι =
√
Pmax − κ2, we can combine the two constraints in problem (42)
into one single constraint
(
κ
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣ +√Pmax − κ2 ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣)2 = φ (R1), and thus problem (42)
is simplified as the following single-variable optimization problem.
min
κ≥0
κ2 ‖g2‖2
s.t. κ
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣+√Pmax − κ2 ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣ =√φ (R1).
(43)
It is interesting to observe that the unique equality constraint in problem (43) can be equiva-
lently transformed to the following quadratic equation with respect to κ:
a0κ
2 − 2 ∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣√φ (R1)κ + φ (R1)− ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2 Pmax = 0, (44)
where a0 =
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣2 + ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2.
It is easy to check that the discriminant of the quadratic equation defined in (44) is greater
than zero, i.e., a0Pmax − φ (R1) > 0. Thus, it has two distinct real roots and are respectively
given by
κ1∗ =
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣√φ (R1)− ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣√a0Pmax − φ (R1)
a0
, (45)
κ2∗ =
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣√φ (R1) + ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣√a0Pmax − φ (R1)
a0
. (46)
Next, we show that κ1∗ ≥ 0 by contradiction. Suppose that κ1∗ < 0. Then, we have∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣√φ (R1)− ∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣√a0Pmax − φ (R1)
a0
< 0. (47)
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Note that the inequality in (47) can be directly simplified as φ (R1) < Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, which
contradicts the above assumption that φ (R1) ≥ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2. Thus, κ1∗ ≥ 0 is true.
As a result, κ1∗ and κ2∗ are two feasible solutions to problem (43). Obviously, κ1∗ is the
optimal solution to problem (43) because it leads to a smaller objective value than κ2∗. Thus,
the optimal solutions to problem (42) are
κ∗ = κ1∗, ι∗ =
√
Pmax − κ∗2 . (48)
Combining (37) and (48), we obtain that, if φ (R1) ≥ Pmax
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣2, the solutions to problem
(11) are
α∗ = κ1∗e−j∠g
H
1 gˆ2, β∗ = ι∗e−j∠g
H
1 gˆ
⊥
2 . (49)
Based on (42) and (49), we obtain the Theorem 1, and the proof is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For convenience, we define a1 = P1 |h1,1|2, a2 = P2 |h2,2|2, c1 = σ˜21 , c2 = σ˜22 , b1 =
∣∣gH1 gˆ2∣∣,
b2 =
∣∣gH1 gˆ⊥2 ∣∣, b3 = b21 + b22, and b4 = ‖g2‖2b23 . Then, fmax (R1) can be re-expressed as
fmax (R1)=log (1 + Γ (R1)) , (50)
where Γ (R1) =
a2b23
b4
(
b1
√
φ(R1)−b2
√
b3Pmax−φ(R1)
)2
+c2
, with φ (R1) =
a1
2R1−1
− c1.
By taking into account the monotonicity of the logarithm function, we know that the mono-
tonicity of fmax (R1) is similar to that of Γ (R1). Therefore, we turn to check the monotonicity
of Γ (R1). Specifically, the first-order derivative of Γ (R1) is given by
Γ′ (R1) =
2R1 ln (2) a1a2b
2
3b4
(
b1√
a1
2R1−1
−c1
+ b2√
c1+b3Pmax−
a1
2R1−1
)
ϕ (R1)
(2R1 − 1)2 (b4ϕ (R1)2 + c2)2 , (51)
where ϕ (R1) = b1
√
a1
2R1−1
− c1 − b2
√
c1 + b3Pmax − a12R1−1 .
Obviously, whether Γ′ (R1) is positive or not depends only on ϕ (R1). By contradiction, it is
easy to check that ϕ (R1) is positive when R1 < R
ZF2
1 . Hence, we know that Γ
′ (R1) > 0 when
R1 < R
ZF2
1 . As a result, we arrive at Proposition 1, which completes the proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first apply the triangle inequality to the objective function of problem
(16), which yields
∣∣µgH2 gˆ1 + νgH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣2 ≤ (|µ| ∣∣gH2 gˆ1∣∣+ |ν| ∣∣gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣)2 , (52)
where the equality holds when ∠µ+ ∠gH2 gˆ1 = ∠ν + ∠g
H
2 gˆ
⊥
1 . Notice that the phases of µ and
ν do not affect the feasible set of problem (16). Therefore, the optimal solution to problem (16)
should make the equality in (52) hold. Without loss of generality, we let
∠µ∗ = −∠gH2 gˆ1, and ∠ν∗ = −∠gH2 gˆ⊥1 . (53)
By contradiction, we can easily verify that the power constraint in problem (16) should be
active at the optimal solution, i.e., |µ∗|2 + |ν∗|2 = Pmax. Then, we have
|µ∗|2 = φ (R1)‖g1‖2
and |ν∗|2 = Pmax − φ (R1)‖g1‖2
. (54)
From (53) and (54), it follows that
µ∗ =
√
φ (R1)
‖g1‖2
e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ1 , ν∗ =
√
Pmax − φ (R1)‖g1‖2
e−j∠g
H
2 gˆ
⊥
1 (55)
Then, according to Lemma 4 and (55), we can obtain the optimal solution to problem (15),
i.e., wopt = µ
∗gˆ1 + ν
∗gˆ⊥1 . By substituting Q = woptw
H
opt to the objective function of problem
(8), the closed-form expression of fmin (R1) is thus given by
fmin (R1) = log
(
1 +
P2 |h2,2|2(|µ∗| |gH2 gˆ1|+ |ν∗| ∣∣gH2 gˆ⊥1 ∣∣)2 + σ˜22
)
. (56)
Hence, the proof is completed.
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